concern, a stated use-of-force policy that advertises preemptive and unilateral action is a target of criticism from political leaders both at home and abroad. The primary fears appear focused on a perception of U.S. hegemonic muscle flexing, a disregard of the United Nations (UN) multilateral consensus process, and blatant use of coercive language enforced by unmatched military might. Of immediate concern to American decision-makers is the increasing rift between the U.S. and other world-leaders on both the scope and severity of the threat. As a result, U.S. voice on how to combat the 'new global threats' is often blunted before the United Nations (UN) and world opinion on American policy turns negative.
In reply to the transnational threats that fully emerged on 9/11, America declared a 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT) that encompasses persistent application of all instruments of power in combined, simultaneous execution. Because a global effort of all nations is required, the diplomatic tool is the backbone of the overarching campaign, accompanied by significant emphasis on other than military means -economic, law enforcement, and intelligence tools-to crush terrorist capability. 1 However, in critical analysis of the current NSS, the focus of world opinion is centered on small passages dealing with the military instrument-specifically, what is coined the 'doctrine of preemption'. 2 This paper identifies and examines the basis for current U.S. policy-the threat-and discusses the relevance of the traditional power conceptsprimarily coercive diplomacy-in countering the threat. In the context of both the NSS and National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NS-CT), possible triggers for executing preemptive action are explored based off assumptions formulated on policy intent; actual intent is only truly known by those who framed the policy. The main goal of this paper is two-fold: first, to provide Highlighted Portions of the Globe Represent Non-Integrating Regions of the World Affected by an Absence of Globalization.
clarity to the controversial rhetoric of the NSS on preemptive (or unilateral) action, illustrating its use as the exception to the norm; traditional concepts of power have greater applicability in achieving policy ends. And secondly, propose the need for institutional reform at the UN. The threat is truly global, aimed at serving indiscriminate mass murder and destruction to both the developed and developing world; to remain a relevant institution for promoting global peace and stability, the UN must remove the diplomatic gloves of politeness and directly engage MemberStates with collaborating ties or a blind eye to terror.
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT
To fully understand the threats facing America today, it's first necessary to capture an understanding of its origins, in terms of both geography and cause. Thomas P.M. Barnett The NS-CT indirectly makes reference to the 'Gap' region by describing the underlying conditions that allow terrorist organizations to rally support to 'the cause'-poverty, corruption, religious and ethnic conflict-all symptoms of 'non-integrating' countries. 9 The Muslim regions of the world fall directly in this group. Lying directly in the geography of the 'Gap', this region predominately spans from North Africa through the Middle East and Central Asia, to Indonesia and the South Pacific. Referred to as the 'arc of chaos' or 'arc of instability', this region is, to a FIGURE 2. THE GEOGRAPHY OF 'THE GAP' "Challenges such as the world's vast stretches of ungoverned areas-lawless zones, veritable 'no-man's lands' like some of the areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border-where extremist movements find shelter and can win the breathing space to grow."
12 "Challenges such as the numbers of societies and peoples excluded from the benefits of an expanding global economy, where the daily lot is hunger, disease, and displacement-and that produce large populations of disaffected youth who are prime recruits for our extremist foes." 13 He's referring to 'Gap Nations' here.
The DCI further emphasized that while globalization is a 'net plus' for the global economy, in lesser developed countries it has become a disruptive force, especially in the politically and economically repressive Arab nations. Those populations receive the full brunt of cultural change that hitchhikes on the vehicle of globalization without gaining a share of the economic profits; coupled with a large, youthful, unemployed, poverty-ridden class of citizens creates a soft environment to radical influence. 14 This region gave birth to 'the new terrorism'.
THE NEW TERRORISM IS OPERATIONALLY GLOBAL
Usama bin Laden (UBL) and al-Qaeda (AQ) weren't new phenomena to America prior to their 9/11 terror attacks on U.S. soil. In the last decade alone, AQ punctuated American history through violent attacks of increasingly organized and coordinated skill: the first World Trade
Center bombing ('93); the Khobar Towers bombing ('96); the near simultaneous bombings of two U.S. embassies on the African continent ('98); and the assault on the USS Cole ('00). 15 Unfortunately, it took a radical event like "9/11" to fully shake America awake to the evolution of terrorism, the 'new terrorism', where the "attacks were not only the acts of asymmetric warfare, they were the acts of an asymmetric foe." 16 As a result, the U.S. catapulted from a reactionary counterterrorism (CT) posture to an aggressive campaign focused on the offense; AQ, the most "…the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous."
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Furthermore, the NSS is forthright on the ineffectiveness of a single defensive strategy founded on deterrence to counter such threats:
"…deterrence based only on the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states…," and, "…traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents." "The deadly combination of outlaw regimes and terror networks and weapons of mass murder is a peril that cannot be ignored or wished away. If such a danger is allowed to fully materialize, all words, all protests, will come too late. Nations of the world must have the wisdom and the will to stop grave threats before they arrive." 36 (Emphasis added).
In response, the Bush Doctrine puts in place a clear, declaratory use-of-force policy base on a strategy of preemption.
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TRADITIONAL POWER CONCEPTS AND PREEMPTIVE ACTION
Before taking on the task of exploring the use-of-force concept of preemption-actual commitment of the military instrument to hostilities in 'first strike' fashion-it's important to understand the traditional power concepts that stem primarily from the diplomatic (and economic) instrument and structured towards the defensive arm of strategy. There are varying schools of thought on how the three primary and enduring power concepts of deterrence, compellence, and coercion differ. However, one common thread is they are all tools of "a political-military strategy for reconciling a conflict of interest with an adversary." 38 Coercion is the attempt to influence behavior by using the 'stick and carrot' approach-with a strong emphasis on the negative aspects of the 'stick' (threatened penalties). The use of deterrence involves the attempt to prevent undesired action from an opponent by stating a resulting consequence to that action. 39 Compellence, on the other hand, involves an action or commitment to action to illicit a desired response from the opponent. 40 The important difference here is that compellence involves an action -getting a state to change ongoing behavior-while deterrence involves preventing an action -preventing a state from initiating an action. 41 While the U.S. uses all three interrelated concepts, deterrence was the cornerstone to America's NSS for over 50-plus years. It's strongly based on the adversary's rational decisionmaking process to make a 'cost-benefit calculation'-what the aggressor gains in relation to the massive and punishing retaliatory strike he will incur. 42 It's here that deterrence falls short when applied to a terrorist organization like AQ-they strike not only to murder innocents, but to provoke an exaggerated military response that feeds their cause. 43 In regards to the 'threat triad', the historical power concepts of deterrence, compellence, and coercion, while lacking merit against terrorist organizations, 44 remain relevant against rogue regimes and state sponsors of terror 45 -both have something tangible to lose. The question of concept relevance in today's security environment is directly related to the necessity of time-it may take months or years for the concepts of compellence and coercion to take effect. In the case of deterrence, it's never truly proven if the concept indeed prevented hostile action … there's no way to measure what an adversary doesn't do. In context of today's 'imminent' threat-it can strike at anytime with questionable motive and incredible destruction-the time it takes for defensive strategies like coercion, compellence and deterrence to work is an unaffordable luxury in today's security environment. While defensive strategies remain the U.S. flagship for countering threats, a flexible offensive military tool is a necessity-"adding preemption to America's quiver made strategic sense." 46 The NSS is direct in stating the U.S. offensive response to the nondeterrable imminent threat:
A policy of "anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack…to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."
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The NSS further emphasizes U.S. resolve to act alone:
"While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists."
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The theme of preemptive and unilateral action is routinely emphasized by the Bush Administration to both domestic and international audiences. And it's this theme that has provoked controversy and drawn criticism from political leaders at home and abroad.
BASIS FOR CRITICISM: THE 'RULE OF LAW'
Critics are quick to damn preemptive action as described by the NSS and NS-CT for a variety of reasons, but nearly all stress a common ground-in their view, it's not legal in terms of international law (custom/tradition based) and the UN Charter, Article 51 (institutional law).
Traditional international law adopted the legitimacy of preemptive action as a concept of anticipatory self-defense, based on the Caroline incident of 1837, under two criteria: first, immediacy of the threat-an attack by an adversary was so imminent that nothing could be done to stop it except attacking first; and secondly, proportionality-the defenders preemptive attack must be in proportion to the proposed threat of the attacker. 49 While traditional international law is normally accepted as legal basis for how nations interact, including the use of force, Article 51 of the UN Charter further restricts actions of self-defense by including the phrase "once an attack has already occurred." 50 While the purpose of Article 51 is to deter
Member-State aggression, the reality of waiting for an actual attack that's imminent defies logic-a nation has the inherent right of self-defense without incurring an attack. 51 The Bush Doctrine clearly makes reference to the legality of preemptive action:
"International law (tradition-based) recognize that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack." Criticism of the Bush Doctrine's offensive stance of preempting today's threats before they fully materialize span the full spectrum, from those that support the policy but disagree on advertising it, to full tilt hostility of what is perceived as imperial arrogance of the Bush Administration. "Some analysts believe that it is counterproductive to make explicit the conditions under which America will strike first, and there are compelling reasons for blurring the line between preemption and prevention." 56 Other "critics argue that this attempt to include preventive military action under the category of preemption has no legal basis," 57 or, "goes well beyond even the right to anticipatory self-defense that has been commonly interpreted to flow from Article 51 of the UN Charter, and thus the Bush strategy will undermine international law and lead other states to use U.S. policy as a pretext for aggression." 58 U.S. historical allies, most importantly France and Germany, voice concerns over the unilateral posture a strategy of preemption propagates, especially when overtly tied to a U.S. stated willingness to act alone.
Perhaps of greater concern to European allies is that the U.S. declaratory use of a preemptive option to a category of generic threats lacks clarity and thus invites trouble. 59 That opens the door to this paper's real purpose: what is policy intent in terms of criteria or triggers to implement its use?
PREEMPTIVE USE OF FORCE: POLICY INTENT
While many critics find a stated preemptive use-of-force option reckless, and for the incredible amount of controversy generated by an extremely small section of the NSS, the U.S.
has yet to overtly exercise preemptive action in the GWOT campaign. Looking at specific examples of U.S.-led operations against terror since 9/11-Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen-none involved preemptive action and none were executed entirely unilaterally. In Afghanistan, traditional power concepts of coercion and compellence were applied to influence the Taliban regime to expel AQ, whom the U.S. was already at war. When those concepts failed, the Taliban received the full brunt of the 'stick', resulting in Afghan regime change and a continuing AQ hunt. 60 Iraq fell to the same tactics, although over an expanded timeframe. Acts of coercion, compellence, and retaliatory strikes were applied to deter and contain Iraqi aggression and military capacity for 12-plus years. Due to their failure, and, more importantly, compounded by the renewed perception of threat generated by 9/11, the U.S. issued an ultimatum (required by compellence), which, when ignored, led to regime change. In Yemen, through a combined operation with the host nation (HN) government, the U.S struck a top AQ leader with a Hellfire missile fired from an Unmanned Aircraft Vehicle (UAV). The targeted personality was complicit in the USS Cole attack and a conspiring member of an enemy combatant force (AQ). On the strategic stage, nothing was preemptive in either of the cases. However, policy controversy arose during the road to Iraq-more over U.S. willingness to act without UN Security Council consensus-and the Bush Doctrine language of preemptive action was caught in the crossfire.
While difficult to outline an all-encompassing list of criteria to legitimize preemptive force, generalized clarity on policy intent could help alleviate UN concerns.
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS FOR PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS
The Bush Doctrine doesn't provide clear guidance for use of preemptive force beyond generic statements of immediate threats, nor should it. The message delivered by the NSS instead addresses threat severity and unpredictability, calls for an international response, and speaks clearly of the willingness to engage it directly and, if required, preempt it. Policy interpretation, U.S. behavior since 9/11, and, to an even greater extent, common sense sets forth the following assumptions on U.S. use-of-force policy:
Assumption 1: The diplomatic instrument of power has primacy in GWOT; the U.S. preferred course of action for dealing with security threats is through diplomatic channels-the UN Security Council, multilateral approaches, and bilateral agreements-for international responses primarily centered on non-violent means and ways. The U.S., through the UN, energized incredible leaps in cooperation among Member-States at attacking terrorist funding (freezing finances, exposing charity schemes, and discovering front companies for money laundering);
helping weak nations prevent terrorist sanctuary and operating bases (look at Pakistan and not only denounce terrorism, but pledged participation in the international GWOT campaign. 61 While the initial motivation behind the radical change in Libya's persona was most certainly influenced by events in Iraq, it was through 'quiet diplomacy' that brought them to proclaim desire to conform to international norms. 62 Diplomatic crosshairs are currently focused on Iran, Syria, and North Korea to follow suit. Applying the assumptions to the strategy put forth in the NS-CT, it becomes clearer that the use of preemptive action will be rare. The NS-CT focuses on four types of nation-states in relation to both their desire and capability for combating terror: 1) the "willing and able"; 2) the "weak, but willing"; 3) the "reluctant"; and 4) the "unwilling"; 63 the NSS adds a fifth category, the "rogue regime". This section of the paper will explore policy intent in regards to the five nationstate types listed above. It must be emphasized that the risk associated with 'doing-nothing' increases dramatically with the introduction of WMD to the equation. If U.S. decision-makers catch wind of a possible or actual WMD transfer to terrorist organizations, they will strike it in quick, preemptive fashion. Furthermore, because the U.S. is currently at war with global terrorism, of which AQ is a primary adversary, all actions on global terrorism may not by definition be preemptive. However, problems will arise if the U.S. strikes AQ on the sovereign soil of an unwitting country or attacks a country deemed 'rogue' without UN Security Council consensus.
"Willing And Able Nations"
As stated in the NS-CT, "no support will be more important to success than that from the other nations that have the will and resources to combat terrorism with us at the state, regional, and even global level." 64 The 'willing and able' represent the 'integrating core' nations, the regional leaders fully engaged in the global market economy. They have both the 'will'-which stems from national interest-and the 'means'-diplomatic, economic, informational, and military clout, or a combination of-to significantly contribute to the GWOT. These countries represent the 'free-world' and are the target of an aggressive U.S. persuasive diplomacy campaign to garner continued support. It's the political leadership of these countries that may be critical of U.S. use-of-force statements. As such, these nations should be the target audience for U.S. clarification of use-of-force/preemptive policy intent; their support is integral to global CT operations. The NSS rhetoric illustrates U.S. resolve to act militarily in the GWOT campaign and demonstrates the seriousness of American intent to allies; the greater allied cooperation in the global CT arena, the less likely the U.S. military will need to unilaterally strike. 65 And as the memories of 9/11 fade, "ensuring that the current level of international cooperation is a lasting feature of our world will be a defining challenge of this era." 66 Preemptive strike is not an option.
"Weak, But Willing Nations"
These nations represent states most at risk of becoming 'safe-havens' and operating bases for global terror. They have the 'will', but lack the 'means'-economy, institutions, and infrastructure-to prevent infestation by terrorist organizations. While the vast majority of this group reside in the geography of the 'Gap', they represent those on the 'seams' attempting to develop and integrate with international norms. The Bush Administration's goal is to "support them vigorously in their efforts to build the institutions and capabilities needed to exercise authority over all their territory and fight terrorism where it exists." 67 This group represents a key goal in the overall GWOT strategy. Persuasive diplomacy is the primary tool for energizing action; these nations have much to gain through cooperation and are targeted for CT funding and programs, from improved legislation and judicial systems to law enforcement and armed forces training. 68 The recent concessions on the part of Libya, if proven genuine over time, will secure this state-sponsor of terror a place in this category. While not directly the focus of U.S.
use-of-force policy, military strikes and raids may occur in these nations against terrorist organizations attempting to take root, subvert, or transit. These operations will normally be accomplished in a combined operation or through close coordination with the HN government.
Examples include: Pakistan and U.S. partnership in countering AQ, both inside Afghanistan and Pakistan; foreign internal defense CT training in the Philippines and Georgia by U.S forces; U.S. basing rights in Djibouti for CT operations in the Horn of Africa; and the U.S-Yemeni UAV Hellfire strike on AQ leadership. Coordinated actions with these nations, to include bilateral or HN-approved unilateral strikes and raids, should have minimal negative impact on the world stage. The primary risk involves secrecy-small factions within the HN government may be sympathetic to 'the terrorist cause' and provide early warning to the target. Preemptive strike is not a likely option.
"Reluctant Nations"
Reluctant nations are "difficult cases involving countries that, although capable, prove reluctant to comply with their responsibilities in the fight against terror." 69 The Bush
Administration provides a variety of reasons for state reluctance, from "internal schisms that enable one faction to use the state to extend tacit or active support to terrorists, or cultural or political differences that lead to disagreements over what constitutes "terrorist" or criminal activity." 70 However, the general underlying premise is fear of becoming a target of terrorism.
Also within the geography of the 'Gap', examples of reluctant nations include: pre-9/11 Pakistan and Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. Again, in vague and ambiguous language, the NSS describes reluctant nations as the focus for "constructive engagement, with sustained diplomacy and targeted assistance used to persuade these regimes to become more willing and, eventually able, to meet their international obligations to combat terrorism." 71 This leads to the assumption that persuasive diplomacy is key to altering behavior, most-likely through the UN.
It's more likely coercive diplomacy is the primary tool, with targeted assistance in terms of funds, loans, and training as 'carrots', economic sanctions as the 'stick'. 'Preemptive-like' strikes on terrorist training sites, leadership, and arms caches are available options if coercion, followed by compellence, fails to inspire nation action. These strikes would be last resort options and only executed via actionable intelligence on fleeting targets. Covert or clandestine use of SOF is the military tool of choice through short duration strikes and raids; small SOF teams inserted covertly will reduce possible contact with HN military forces, may be more effective, and should minimize collateral damage risk associated with conventional kinetic weapons. 72 These strikes are considered 'preemptive-like' for two reasons: first, the U.S. is at war against global terrorist organizations, so any military action on their members, organization or infrastructure are simply strikes (battles) in an ongoing war (so not preemptive); but, while the strikes are not directly against the nation the terrorists are operating from, they are executed on the sovereign soil of an 'un-witting' nation, which could be termed a preemptive action against that nation. Strikes conducted without HN approval will generate negative world opinion, especially at the UN.
Traditional power concepts are more appropriate here and use of preemptive strike is a last resort option-the risk of doing nothing must significantly outweigh the risk of possible failure or post-strike political damage.
"Unwilling Nations And Rogue Regimes"
The policy on unwilling states is simple: "we will act decisively to counter the threat they pose and, ultimately, to compel them to cease supporting terrorism," 73 and, "those states that continue to sponsor terrorist organizations will be held accountable for their actions." 74 Example nations include the six DoS listed state sponsors of terror: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. 75 At least one of these states, North Korea, is still deemed rogue. Unwilling states are at greatest risk of receiving both 'preemptive-like' (against terrorist they harbor) and preemptive strikes (against the actual state) from the U.S. But again, the diplomatic instrument Preemptive strikes within 'unwilling states' is a feasible option; coercive diplomacy is more likely with rogues, unless intelligence indicates collaboration with terrorist organizations. It's imperative for the UN to aggressively apply diplomatic arm-twisting to coercively pressure these nations to conform to accepted international norms.
UN REFORM
Non-execution of the preemptive strike option in the two-plus years of the 'declared'
GWOT campaign clearly provides evidence that U.S. leadership understands both the political and physical limitations of the military instrument. Despite international and domestic controversy over its inclusion in the NSS document, preemptive action is a last resort option-its use is reserved for significant and/or fleeting threats. Dr Condoleezza Rice, through public speeches and interviews, often stresses U.S. caution in using preemptive action:
"The number of cases in which it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light-to the United States or any other nation-to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of action."
76
And on the merits of the diplomatic instrument:
"Anticipatory defense (preemption) should not be used as a cover for aggression.
It really should be a rare occurrence. There are threats amenable to being dealt with in other ways, whether through diplomacy, or even coercive diplomacy…."
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Yet the mention of preemptive action strikes a raw nerve with world leaders; that may very well be intentional by this Administration. The Bush Doctrine provoked both international debate and reevaluation of the global security environment. Threats today don't require the massing of armies and machinery, an event that can be observed, contained and deterred over time; today, terrorists are capable of striking with little to no warning using destructive force that's both indiscriminate and un-proportional. 78 And:
"The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual
States may use force 'preemptively' against perceived threats. Its members may need to begin discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats-for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.
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Hopefully, in the face of an uncertain and ambiguous security environment, Member-States listened.
CONCLUSION
It took mass murder on 9/11 to alert the world to the decade long evolution of terrorism. Now, fully capable of global reach, terrorist ability to organize and leverage technology puts the entire free-world at risk. The threat is imminent-global terrorist organizations, like AQ, are currently marshalling forces and planning attacks; they can strike at a time and place of their choosing. The threat is capable of mass destruction-they will use technology to multiply effects. The threat is in search of WMD, either through black-market purchase or rogue state alliances. The threat receives sponsorship from nation-states or from sympathetic elements within their societies. In response, the Bush Administration shed the skin of reactive consequence management for a policy based on action. That policy emphasizes the diplomatic, economic, information, intelligence, and law enforcement tools; the cornerstone of U.S. policy remains a global response. In the two-plus years since 9/11, the international initiatives violations to international norms, should listen carefully to the Bush Administration wordsthey're most at risk. If they continue to harbor, aid, and abet terror, the door is wide open to preemptive strike. However, the preferred option is to push the full weight of the international community to influence rogue behavior. Until the international body at the UN assumes a strong CT leadership role, the U.S. is forced to assume that role and, as a result, receive negative world opinion; UN Security Council head-nod isn't required for the U.S. to prevent a replay of 9/11. The UN may be at a defining moment in its history as it figures out a post-Cold War role.
Regardless, serious reform of UN CT effort is required. Most notably, the UN needs to acknowledge the existence of state-sponsors of terror, develop a list, and put those countries on notice. Resolutions must have teeth and be credible. Focusing international efforts to persuade and/or coerce states to alter behavior will limit terrorist global reach and help negate the need for military action. 
